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T HE TREND indicated in the last two Surveys continued during the
current year. Many of the insurance cases which were decided fav-
orably for insurers turned upon technical construction and application
of insurance contract language. A number of the cases dealt with "good
faith" clauses in applications for life or health and accident insurance; a
number dealt with conditional receipts or temporary insurance; and a
number dealt with incontestable clauses. The technical application of rule
94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure' was continued except for one
opinion which emphasized that rule 94 was not intended to change the
rules regarding burden of proof.
I. HEALTH, LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
A. Procedural Decisions
Pleadings. The general status of rule 94, requiring an insurer to plead spe-
cifically any exception in the policy relied upon as a defense, was eroded
somewhat by one court of civil appeals.! The court held that the insured
had the burden of proving that the specific loss sustained was covered by
the policy even though the insurer filed only a general denial and did not
plead any policy limitations or exceptions in defense. Another court of
civil appeals held that where the defense by the insurer went to a promis-
sory warranty which affected the validity of the policy, such as the issue
of "good health," the burden of proof was still upon the insurer under rule
94. 3
Evidence. The "entire" contract statute of the Insurance Code" generally
has been interpreted to mean that unless an application for an insurance
policy is attached to the policy as required by the statute, the application
does not become a part of the contract and is inadmissible in evidence.'
However, a court of civil appeals held that it was not fundamental error
to admit in evidence an application, not attached to the insurance policy
at the time of its issuance or at the time of the trial, where such applica-
tion was admitted as evidence of fraudulent representations concerning
* A.B., University of Akron; LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
'TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
2 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Crager, 421 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). The court relied
upon its own opinion in Merryman v. Employers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e., which was commented upon in the last Survey as having
demonstrated a misapprehension of rule 94. Davis, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
22 Sw. L.J. 30, 31 (1968).
'Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rivera, 420 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.24 (1963).
5Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), error ref.; National Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Love, 282 S.W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), error dismissed.
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the sound health of the insured.' The court relied upon First Texas Pru-
dential Insurance Co. v. Pedigo,' which held that false representations in
an application upon which the insurer relied in entering the contract were
collateral in nature and thus could serve as a basis of defense even though
the application was not a part of the policy.
Special Issues. It is settled law in Texas that the insured's possession of
sound health on the date the life insurance policy is issued may be made
a condition precedent to the operative effect of the policy.8 In a recent
court of civil appeals decision,9 suit was brought upon a life insurance pol-
icy issued on the life of a six-week-old baby. The policy contained a
sound health clause providing that the policy "shall take effect on the
date of issue, provided the insured is then alive and in sound health, but
not otherwise."1 The trial court refused to submit to the jury numerous
requested issues and instructions, but instead submitted only the ultimate
issue of whether the baby was in unsound health on the date the policy
was issued. The court of civil appeals agreed that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that the baby was not in unsound
health at that time, even though a possible heart murmur had been de-
tected by the baby's doctor.
Incontestable Clauses. In a case of first impression, a court of civil appeals
held that a suit filed by an insurer on the last day of a two-year incon-
testable period was a timely "contest" within the meaning of the incon-
testable clause, even though citation was not served until after the two-
year period." The court examined two supreme court opinions" dealing
with the application of incontestable clauses and the incontestable statute,"
but concluded that those cases did not provide an answer to the current
problem. Instead, the court decided that the case should be governed by
the doctrine established by the supreme court in statute of limitations
cases:'4 "The purpose of the limitation contained in the policy under con-
sideration as required by the Insurance Code is properly implemented by
a decision that an appropriate suit be filed within the contestable period
and the citation be issued and served with reasonable promptness there-
after.""
" Cox v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 420 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
50 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), holding approved.
8Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mayberry, 162 Tex. 492, 347 S.W.2d 598 (1961); Texas
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 158 Tex. 15, 307 S.W.2d 242 (1957).




1"Fields v. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error
dismissed.
"2Patton v. American Home Mut. Life Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 373, 185 S.W.2d 420 (1945); Trevino
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 500, 168 S.W.2d 656 (1943).
'aTEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.44 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
"Owen v. City of Eastland, 124 Tex. 419, 78 S.W.2d 178 (1935); Windom v. Howard, 86
Tex. 560, 26 S.W. 483 (1894); Ricker v. Shoemaker, 81 Tex. 22, 16 S.W. 645 (1891).




Another case10 dealt with a 1963 amendment to the Insurance Code and
its effect upon incontestable clauses in policies issued prior to amendment.
This amendment provides that a policy shall become incontestable "after
it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for two (2) years
from its date."1 The policy involved contained, in accordance with the
Insurance Code prior to 1963, s a provision that it would be incontestable
after two full years from the date of issuance. The insured died within
the two-year contestable period, but the insurer did not contest the policy
until more than two years after the date of issuance. The insurer argued
that the insured was not in sound health at the time the policy was issued
and that the incontestable clause did not apply because the policy had
not been in force for two years during the lifetime of the insured. The
court held that the amendment did not apply to policies issued prior to
its effective date; thus, the policy had become incontestable since the in-
surer sought to contest it only after the expiration of two years from the
date of issuance.
A third civil appeals case held that the two-year incontestability statute
did not apply to a group policy or certificate issued to a named insured
for more than two years where the policy and the certificate never became
effective.1" The group policy was written in accordance with the provisions
of a special statute authorizing group life insurance covering purchases of
land under the Veteran's Land Program."0 The proceeds of the policy on
the death of the insured would cancel any indebtedness remaining as a re-
sult of the purchase. The statute provided that the master contract could
contain a provision that coverage would terminate when the purchaser
of the land reached age sixty-five. The master policy and the certificate
issued to the named insured contained such a provision. In addition, the
master policy contained a provision that if a premium was paid on a per-
son over sixty-five years of age, the insurance company would have no
liability in regard to such person. The court distinguished between con-
testing the validity of an insurance contract, to which the two-year incon-
testability statute would apply, and contesting the coverage, meaning, or
application of an insurance contract."' The insurer was not contesting the
validity of the master policy, but was merely insisting upon the observ-
ance of the policy terms and upon compliance with the statute under
which the master policy was issued; 2 thus the statute did not apply.
B. Substantive Decisions
Receipt for Premium and Temporary Coverage as a Contract of Insurance.
Three cases held that no contract of insurance was created where a prem-
16 Lee v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 420 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.44 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
18 1d. art. 3.44 (1963).
"gGreat Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fry, 418 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
"°TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5421m (1962).
21 The court cited a number of cases on this point, including the latest, Mainer v. American
Hosp. & Life Ins. Co., 371 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error ref. n.r.e. The leading case




ium had been accepted, receipt issued therefor, and temporary coverage
provided. One case was decided on the theory that waiver or estoppel can-
not create insurance coverage in a group policy where no coverage ever
existed for the plaintiff -employee. 3 The employee's claim of waiver or es-
toppel was based on payment of the premiums, submission of proof of
loss at the request of the insurer, delivery of the insurance certificate and
identification card to the employee, and partial payment of the proceeds
due under the policy.
The group policy would not become effective in regard to any em-
ployee who was not actually at work on the date his insurance contract
was to become effective until such employee actually returned to work.
In this case, the plaintiff was not at work on the date the coverage would
have become effective, and he never returned to work. The court held that
there was no insurance coverage, relying on Washington National Insur-
ance Co. v. Craddock' in which the supreme court held that contractual
insurance liability cannot be created by waiver.
In another case the beneficiaries of a deceased insured were denied re-
covery under the terms of the conditional receipt which had been issued
by the insurer to the insured upon payment of the first month's premium."
At the time the insured made application for insurance, he furnished in-
formation to the soliciting agent that he had been treated for an ulcer
in 1963 and that in 1965 an ulcer had affected him adversely in insurance
matters. The conditional receipt provided: "The insurance for which appli-
cation is made shall be effective (1) on the date of this receipt or (2) on the
date of completion of all medical examinations required by Company
rules and practices, whichever date is later, if on such effective date all
persons to be insured are in good health and acceptable for insurance under
the established rules and practices of the Company for the plan amount,
and premium applied for.""s Shortly after paying the first premium, the
applicant died from causes unrelated to any condition of health stated in
his application for insurance.
Under the rules and practices of the insurance company, an applicant
for insurance who had suffered from or been treated for an ulcer within
the past five or ten years was required to undergo a medical examination
regardless of the amount of insurance sought. The court held that there
was no liability under the receipt because a medical examination was pre-
requisite to insurance coverage and the applicant had not undergone such
an examination.
In the third case 7 an applicant for disability insurance was assured by
the soliciting agent that his coverage would become effective immediately
upon his signing an application, paying an amount in excess of the month-
ly premium, and receiving a receipt therefor. Both the receipt and the ap-
plication were dated December 1, 1965. Shortly thereafter, applicant was
"
3 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.c.
24130 Tex. 251, 109 S.W.2d 165 (1937).
" Bobbitt v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"
6 Id. at 920.21Marshall v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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accidentally injured, and sometime later he received a policy which showed
an issue date of December 14, 1965, which was subsequent to his injury.
The application, the receipt, and the policy provided that no coverage
would become effective until the date the policy was issued and that the
agent had no power to make an oral contract for the company. The court
found that these instruments conclusively negated the existence of a valid,
temporary insurance policy.
Contract Interpretation.
Conflicting Provisions, Yet Harmonious. The award for the worst insur-
ance decision of the year goes to a court of civil appeals which found that
certain provisions in a life insurance policy were inconsistent and in con-
flict with each other, yet by the use of misapplied rules of construction
"harmonized" the conflicting provisions.28 The court then concluded that
the policy was unambiguous and upheld the conflicting provision which
was most advantageous to the insurer. A detailed presentation of this case
is necessary to explain the results.
The parents of Randy Davis purchased an insurance policy on Randy's
life when he was five years old. Under the conflicting provisions of the
policy,29 the insurer agreed to pay:
A. The Initial Face Amount if the death of the Insured occurs prior to the
anniversary of this policy nearest the 21st birthday of the Insured.
B. The Ultimate Face Amount if the death of the Insured occurs on or after
the anniversary of this policy nearest the 21st birthday of the Insured.
In conflict, the following phrases appeared on the same page in a box out-
lined in black: "Face Amount to Age 21 (Initial Face Amount) $3000;
Face Amount Thereafter (Ultimate Face Amount) $9000." At the bottom
of the same page appeared the following phrase: "Juvenile Endowment at
Age 60 with Increased Death Benefit at Age 21 with Return Premiums."
Randy became twenty-one years of age on October 11, 1966. He died
on February 3, 1967. Consequently, Randy's mother, the named bene-
ficiary, relying upon the policy provisions calling for payment of "Face
Amount To Age 21 . . . $3000. Face Amount Thereafter . . . $9000."
and the words "Juvenile Endowment at Age 60 with Increased Death
Benefits at Age 21, with Return Premiums" contended that the insurer
was obligated to pay $9,000. However, the court rejected this contention.
The anniversary date of the policy was April 10. April 10, 1967, was
three days nearer Randy's twenty-first birthday than April 10, 1966.
Finding no vagueness in the provisions of A and B, as set out above, the
court ruled that under those provisions, only the initial face amount
($3,000) was due. At the same time, the court admitted: "It is true provi-
sions A and B are inconsistent with, and in conflict with both the provi-
sions in the box, (and the provisions following), when considered alone."' "Q
However, the court reasoned that the general rules of construction of in-
28 Davis v. Texas Life Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.




surance policies were the same as those that govern other contracts. Thus,
the court concluded that when a contract contains both general and spe-
cific provisions relating to the same thing, the specific provisions prevail
over the general if the general provisions follow the specific provisions."
No reason was given for the conclusion that the language in the box
and that following was a generalization of the language used in A and B.
Even if this conclusion is correct, the mere process of classifying provisions
as "general" and "specific" does not make otherwise conflicting provisions
harmonious. The theory applied in the instant case permits the insurer to
make promises in the "general provisions" and take them away in the
"special provisions." The court should have applied the following rule of
construction: when a conflict exists between various provisions of
an insurance policy, the provision more favorable to the insured will con-
trol." As stated by one Texas court: "[T]here is an apparent conflict be-
tween the two provisions, which renders the bond or contract ambiguous
and uncertain, and calls, therefore, for the application of the rule that
where two interpretations equally fair may be given, that which gives the
greater indemnity will prevail. '
Hudman Extended. A court of civil appeals applied the rule laid down
by the supreme court in Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Hud-
man 4 and held that, as a matter of law, a disability caused to the insured
by a fall was not covered by the accident policy where there was medical
testimony that the insured had a pre-existing disease that was a concur-
ring cause of the disability." The insured failed to prove that the acci-
dental injury was the sole proximate cause of the loss; therefore, he failed
to meet the burden imposed by Hudman. Thus the Hudman rule now ap-
plies in disability as well as in death cases.
Exclusion Riders. In an opinion reflecting inconsistency on its face, a
court of civil appeals affirmed a summary judgment for an insurer even
though the insurer failed to prove conclusively that it had complied with
the terms of its own exclusion riders, which compliance was necessary to
make the riders valid exclusions in the policies." When the insured applied
for two policies of insurance, one covering hospital and medical expenses
and the other providing for disability payments, he disclosed previous
trouble with his left knee and pain in his lower back. The insurer claimed
that it had issued policies with "valid exception riders" reading: "If the
" The authority cited by the court to support this rule of construction was 17 AM. Ju. 2D
Contracts § 270 (1964); however, in the same paragraph from which a statement of the general
rule was drawn, the general rule is qualified with the words "although this is not universally or
necessarily so." The court said: "Applying the foregoing rules of construction, we think the lan-
guage in the box (and the following), a generalization of the specific language used in A and B;
and that a reasonable construction with all provisions harmonized renders the policy unambiguous."
Davis v. Texas Life Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 226 S.W. 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), error dismissed;
Indiana & Ohio Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Keiningham, 161 S.W. 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), error ref.
'"Ferris v. Southern Underwriters, 109 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), error ref.
14398 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. 1965), discussed in Davis, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 88 (1967).
wsGreat Am. Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Lothringer, 422 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967),
error ref. n.r.c.
" Reeves v. New York Life Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error dismissed.
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written acceptance of the insured is indicated hereon, it is hereby agreed
that, in addition to other exceptions set forth in this policy, this policy
shall not cover any loss resulting from any injury to the left knee or to
the lumbosacral or sacroiliac regions of the back." 7
In the summary judgment action, the insurer failed to introduce into
evidence the original riders, but instead introduced copies which bore only
the typewritten name of the insured. The insured argued that no written
acceptance was shown or that at least a genuine issue of material fact con-
cerning such acceptance existed. In addition, he argued that the exclusions
were either waived by the insurer or that the insurer was estopped from
relying upon them because the insurer had paid a surgeon's bill for re-
moval of a disc from the insured's back, and because the insurance agent
had made certain statements when soliciting the insurance. The court of
civil appeals affirmed summary judgment for the insurer on the basis of
testimony in the insured's deposition indicating that he knew he had to
agree to the terms of the riders before the policies would be delivered to
him. Furthermore, the court said that the exclusion riders were plain and
unambiguous and that any statements made by the soliciting agent could
not alter them.
This decision seems questionable because the same "plain and unambigu-
ous" provisions of the riders also required them to be accepted in writing
by the insured. The court reiterated the well-known principle that a con-
tract cannot be created by estoppel, but the insured was not trying to
create a contract by estoppel. He merely sued on the contract in an at-
tempt to estop the insurer from relying upon the exclusion in the riders.
Thus the insured took the position that the riders were not part of the con-
tracts. Although not stated by the court, the theory apparently under-
lying its decision was that the riders were created and made valid as part
of the contract through a type of estoppel on the part of the insured. The
court reasoned that the insured knew that the riders must be attached to
the policy and that he must agree to the terms thereof before the policies
were delivered to him, therefore, once the policies were delivered to him,
he was estopped to deny that the riders had been created.
Continuous Illness Converted into a "'Different" Sickness Under Terms
of Hospital Policy. An example of how a court's construction of an in-
surance provision may change the nature of a sickness is illustrated by an
opinion in which the court construed a family hospital policy."" The policy
provided that "[i]f, following a period for which expense is payable un-
der this policy by reason of any one period of sickness, no expense covered
by this policy is incurred as a result of such sickness for a period of six
consecutive months, but thereafter expenses are incurred from the same
cause, such expense so incurred shall be deemed to be the result of a differ-
ent sickness and compensable as a new period of sickness, subject to a new
Deductible Amount."" The insured had been confined to a hospital on
"Id. at 687.




May 10, 1965 and the expenses for such confinement came within the
terms of the policy and were paid by the insurer. The insured was again
confined to the hospital on July 8, 1966, for a recurrence of the same ill-
ness. Between the first and second hospital confinements, the insurer can-
celled the policy. In affirming summary judgment for the insurer, the
court found the above provision to be clear and valid. The second hos-
pital confinement admitted by both parties to be for a recurring illness
was, under the terms of the policy, for a "different" sickness occurring
after the policy had been cancelled.
The Insurance Code contains a provision, specifically referring to hos-
pitalization insurance, which states in part: "Cancellation shall be without
prejudice to any claim originating prior to the effective date of cancella-
tion." ° The court agreed that the settled law in Texas is that cancellation
of the type of policy involved must be without prejudice to any claim
originating prior to the effective date of cancellation." Although the pol-
icy provision has the effect of changing the settled law and the Insurance
Code effect, the court upheld it, stating: "We are bound to give clear and
valid provisions of the contract effect."'
Payment of Proceeds.
Assignee Rights Superior to Subsequently Named Beneficiary. In Mc-
Allen State Bank v. Texas Bank & Trust Co.' the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the position that an assignment or pledge of a life insurance pol-
icy as security created in the assignee or pledgee rights in the proceeds of
the policy that were superior to a subsequently named beneficiary even
though the insured reserved the right to change beneficiaries. The court
found that the first bank was entitled to the proceeds as pledgee of the
policy in question, although the insured retained possession of the policy
and subsequently changed the beneficiary of the policy to a different bank
as trustee. The court's ruling was based upon the theory that an assignee
or pledgee of a policy for security obtains a lien on the proceeds and,
therefore, has a vested interest while the named beneficiary has only an
expectancy in the proceeds. The court approved the policy reasons stated
in Davis v. Modern Industrial Bank" that a vested right in the assignee or
pledgee makes the insurance policy a more valuable property for purposes
of borrowing in time of financial need.
Wife's Powers as Community Manager To Change Beneficiary Named
by Husband in Policy on His Life. In a case of first impression, a court of
civil appeals held that the wife of an incompetent insured, where the wife
was the manager of the community, had the right to change the benefi-
ciary under a policy purchased with community funds on the life of her
4
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70-3(8) (1963).
" Washer v. Continental Cas. Co., 418 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.;
see American Bankers Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 369 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error dis-
missed; Drinkard v. Group Hosp. Serv., Inc., 366 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error ref.
n.r.e.; American Benefit Ass'n v. Russell, 278 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error dismissed.
4 Washer v. Continental Cas. Co., 418 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
4a433 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1968).4279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E.2d 639 (1939).
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husband.' The insured husband had been unconscious for several years
and probably would remain incompetent for the remainder of his life.
Thus, the probate court had entered an order giving the wife full author-
ity to manage, control, and dispose of the community estate, including
the part which the incompetent husband would legally have power to
manage in the absence of his incompetency.
The wife sought to change the beneficiary from the estate of the hus-
band to herself, and should she not survive the husband, then to her es-
tate. The children of the husband by a prior marriage opposed the appli-
cation for the change of beneficiary, and the insurance company brought
a declaratory judgment action for a determination of whether the wife
had the power to change the beneficiary. Citing Brown v. Lee, " which held
that the right to receive insurance proceeds payable at a future but un-
certain date is property and, when purchased with community funds, is
community property, the court in the instant case held that the owner-
ship of the unmatured policy was a portion of the community estate of
the wife and the incompetent husband. The court then concluded that
neither the insurance company nor the beneficiaries presently named in
the policy had any vested interest in the policy or present legal standing
to question the validity of the wife's action. The court left unanswered
the question concerning the ownership of the policy proceeds which would
arise should the incompetent husband predecease the wife. Such question,
the court reasoned, was not properly the subject for a declaratory judg-
ment.
II. FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
Proving the Loss. In Jacaman v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Under-
writers, Inc.47 a divided Texas Supreme Court upheld an instructed verdict
for the insurer on the theory that the loss sustained on insured property
was a matter of speculation. Suit was brought on two fire insurance poli-
cies covering the "contents," including the stock of merchandise, of a
specifically described building. All of this merchandise was moved from
the building to a new location and commingled with other merchandise.
The insurer's local agent orally agreed that the policies would cover the
merchandise moved to the new location. Shortly thereafter, merchandise
at the second location was destroyed by fire.
The insured asserted that the acts of the insurer's agent in assuring him
that coverage was not impaired and in taking no action to cancel the pol-
icies or to return the unearned premiums constituted a waiver of the in-
sured's breach of the policies. The majority agreed that the cases cited by
the insured supported this proposition. 8 However, the court held that the
'Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).46371 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1963).
4'422 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1967).
4The insured cited the following cases: Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mallard, 13 S.W.2d
895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), error dismissed; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Taylor, 11 S.W.2d




legal effect of such action was to provide insurance only upon the property
described in the policies (i.e., the contents of merchandise at the original
location); there was nothing in the record to indicate that the insurer
had agreed to extend the coverage under these policies to all merchandise
at the second location. The court reasoned that even though the insured
had established the total loss of commingled merchandise caused by the
fire at the second location, he had failed to prove the proportion of the
destroyed merchandise which had been moved from the original location
to the second location. Thus the insured had failed to prove the loss cov-
ered by the policies.
The dissenters, however, argued that the legal effect of the agent's agree-
ment to provide coverage upon the stock of merchandise at the new loca-
tion was tantamount to a written endorsement to the policies, giving the
insurer's consent to a change of location. Therefore, the policies provided
coverage on a changing stock of merchandise at the new location just as
those policies had provided coverage on a changing stock of merchandise
at the original location. Thus, since the value of the merchandise destroyed
was in excess of all insurance coverage, the insurer should be liable for the
full amount of the policies. Since all of the justices agreed that there was
coverage at the new location and since the insured suffered a loss in excess
of the total policy limits, the dissenting opinion appears to be the better
view.
Making the Contract. In an unusual case, a court of civil appeals upheld
an oral contract of fire insurance on an airplane even though subsequent
to this agreement the insurer had issued a written policy of insurance
which did not conform to the oral agreement.49 The oral agreement pro-
vided "trip insurance" coverage on the airplane while it was being flown
from Guatamala to Texas, a trip which required several days because the
airplane was not equipped to fly at night. The airplane was destroyed by
fire on the third day of the trip. After the insurer learned of the loss, it
issued a written policy containing a provision that insurance coverage
was for only one specific day which was two days before the trip began.
The court upheld a jury finding that the policy was willfully and fraudu-
lently written so as not to conform to the oral agreement. Thus the in-
surer was liable for actual and exemplary damages for the wrongful acts
of its agents.
Contract Interpretation.
Policy Provision Requiring Suit To Be Filed Within Two Years and
One Day After Claim Arose Held To Be a Forfeiture Provision Subject to
Waiver or Estoppel. One insured recovered for sonic boom damage to
his home even though he did not file suit until about three months after
the time limit set in the policy for bringing such action." The jury found
that the insured's claim was not finally and conclusively denied by the
'Export Ins. Co. v. Herrera, 426 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.5 0 Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. -oweth, 419 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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insurer on the date claimed by the insurer but, instead, the insurer's a-
gents, by their actions, had led the insured to believe, even up to the time of
suit, that his claim was still being considered and was in the process of ad-
justment. The trial court held that the insurer was estopped to rely upon
the limitation provision in the policy. The court of appeals affirmed on
the theory that the limitation provision was a forfeiture clause which
should be strictly construed and subject to waiver or estoppel upon slight
evidence."'
Damage to Brick Flooring by Muriatic Acid Is Corrosion Not Contam-
ination. Webster's Dictionary performed an important role in the supreme
court's consideration of the difference between "corrosion" and "contam-
ination.""' The insured sued the insurer on a Builders Risk Insurance Pol-
icy, which covered all risks of physical loss to the particular building de-
scribed in the policy. Under the exclusions were these words: "[T]his
policy does not insure against .. .loss by contamination, including such
loss by radioactive or fissionable materials."a The jury found that the
building was damaged as a result of the application of muriatic acid to the
brick flooring, and the trial court rendered judgment for the insured. The
court of civil appeals reversed, holding that the evidence established as a
matter of law that the loss was due to contamination and came within
the exclusion."
However, the supreme court held that the damage sustained was due to
corrosion of the metal parts and thus fell within the policy coverage. The
court consulted Webster's Third New International Dictionary for the
definitions of "corrode" and "contaminate" and concluded that corrosion
and contamination are not synonymous terms. The connotation of contam-
ination is a mixing of substances like dirt and water which results in an
impure mixture. Corrosion, on the other hand, denotes disintegration,
oxidation, decay of metal, and the like. The court also held that the in-
sured was not required to sue on the original policy where the insurer had
delivered to the insured only a copy of a memorandum of insurance. In
this regard, the court cited Standard National Insurance Co. v. Bayless"
with approval: "[A]ppellees being the insured therein had a property
right in said policies, and having instituted suit upon them, the very na-
ture of the suit puts the opposite party who holds the instruments upon
notice to produce them."
Homeowner's "All Risks of Physical Loss" Policy Does Not Cover Loss
to Bricks Caused by Inherent Vice and Extreme Temperatures. In another
civil appeals decision summary judgment for the insured was reversed be-
cause the loss came within the exclusionary provisions of the homeowner's
" The court relied upon several old Texas cases to support its theory. Burlington Ins. Co. v.
Tobey, 30 S.W. 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trawick, 80 Tex. 270, 15
S.W. 568 (1891); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McGregor, 63 Tex. 399 (1885).
1 McConnell Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1968).
as Id.
4 Insurance Co. of St. Louis v. McConnell Constr. Co., 419 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967),
rev'd, 428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1968).
" 338 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), error ref. .r.e.
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"all risk of physical loss" policy." The walls of the home were made of
porous brick which would absorb water, and upon freezing, the water
caused the bricks to crack and fall away. The policy specifically excluded
loss caused by "inherent vice" and "extreme temperatures." The court
relied upon Employers Casualty Co. v. Holm5" for the definition of "in-
herent vice": "The term 'inherent vice' as a cause of loss not covered by
the policy, does not relate to an extraneous cause but to a loss entirely from
internal decomposition or some quality which brings about its own injury
or destruction. The vice must be inherent in the property."58 The court
held that the damage was caused by "inherent vice" as well as "extreme
temperatures" within the meaning of the exclusionary clause of the pol-
icy.
While the bricks were defective in that they were porous and absorbed
water more freely than other bricks, expert opinion indicated that the
loss was caused by rainwater entering the brick, causing the damage upon
freezing. This does not appear to come within the definition of "a loss en-
tirely from internal decomposition or some quality that brings about its
own injury or destruction." The bricks would not have cracked solely be-
cause of their porous condition; it was necessary that the water enter them
and freeze. Thus it seems to this writer that the loss did not come within
the "inherent vice" exclusionary provision of the policy.
Failure of Insured To Notify Insurer of Illness of Race Horse Precluded
Recovery. The importance of knowing the reporting requirements of the
insurance policy is illustrated by a court of civil appeals decision in which
the insured owners of a race horse failed to recover the value of a horse
which died from an illness that occurred while the policy was in force."9
The court based its decision upon a provision of the policy requiring the
insured to notify the insurer immediately when an animal became ill. Fail-
ure to give such notice released the insurer from all liability. The policy
also contained a thirty-day extension clause providing that the insurance
would be extended to cover the death of an animal occurring within thirty
days after the expiration date as a result of an illness manifesting itself
during the period of insurance, provided that the insurer had been noti-
fied in writing prior to the expiration date.
The horse had been ill for twenty-three days before it died and had been
treated by veterinarians several times during this period. The policy ex-
piration date was October 31, 1962. The horse died on November 4, 1962,
and the insurer was notified the following day. The insurer had not been
notified of the illness prior to the notification of death. The court held that
the insurance policy had expired and that the thirty-day extension clause
had never become operative because the insured had failed to give the
notice necessary to activate the extension.
56State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Voiding, 426 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
n.r.e
57393 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
59 426 S.W.2d at 908.




III. AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Insurer's Duty To Defend. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that
where the insurer's refusal to defend its insured is based upon the belief
that the claim of the third party against the insured is groundless, false,
or fraudulent, the insurer's duty to defend is to be determined by looking
only to the policy provisions and to the petition of the third-party claim-
ant." However, one court of civil appeals drew a distinction between this
situation and that in which the insurer's refusal to defend is based upon
the belief that the claim against the insured is not covered by the insur-
ance contract. This court held that in the latter situation, the insurer's
duty to defend its insured is to be determined by looking to known or as-
certainable facts, including in this case a stipulation between the insurer
and the insured and an affidavit attached to the insurer's motion for sum-
mary judgment."1
Payment of Premiums. The insured purchased a policy of automobile in-
surance and mailed to the insurance agent a check in payment of the
monthly premium. Even though the check was payable to the agent and
bore a notation that it was for payment on insurance, the agent held the
check and did not apply it to the premium because the agent wanted the
insured to come to his office to discuss some insurance matters. The in-
surer cancelled the policy on December 26, 1966, for the insured's failure
to pay the premium. Three days later the insured was killed and his auto-
mobile demolished. The widow sued to recover the value of the insured's
automobile, and the trial court rendered judgment against her. However,
the court of civil appeals rejected the insurer's contention that the check
was not a premium payment since there was no express agreement not to
accept checks in payment of premiums, and held that premiums could be
paid by check where the policy or contract of insurance did not provide
otherwise."
Insured Represented by Experienced Insurance Agent Is Bound by Negli-
gence of That Agent. One insured sued the insurer for reformation of his
automobile liability policy because it did not include coverage for medical
payments even though in the written application the insured had re-
quested such coverage." The insurer issued a policy containing no medical
payment provision and did not charge a premium for that type of cov-
erage. This entire transaction had been handled by an experienced insur-
ance agent employed by the insured to handle insurance matters for him.
The court held that where the insured is at all times represented by an
experienced insurance agent, the insured is bound by his agent's negligence
5
°Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1965).
1 Cook v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"
2 Bishop v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error ref. i.r.e.
"




in failing to ascertain that the policy contained no medical payment pro-
vision as requested by the insured.
Contract Interpretation.
Insured Bank Fails To Recover Attorneys' Fees Spent in Defending Suit
Believed To Be Within the Provisions of Bankers Blanket Bond. Recently,
the Supreme Court of Texas6 indicated that where the provision for reim-
bursement of court costs and attorneys' fees is listed in an indemnity bond
under the caption, "[t]he losses covered by this bond are as follows,"
such court costs and attorneys' fees are classified by the bond itself as
"losses." Therefore, the insured need not suffer an actual loss under another
loss provision of the bond before being entitled to reimbursement for
court costs and attorneys' fees incurred and paid in defending against a
third party's claim which appears to be covered by the indemnity provi-
sions of the bond. However, other language in the bond specifically limi-
ted the indemnitor's liability for court costs and attorneys' fees to situa-
tions in which such were incurred in suits or legal proceedings in which
liability or alleged liability of the insured, if established, would constitute
a valid and collectible loss under other loss provisions of the bond. Thus
the court denied the bank recovery because the petition of the third party
claimant against the insured bank did not allege liability of the bank
which if established would have caused it a loss subject to indemnification
under the bond."
Fraud Exclusion Held Not Applicable Where Policy Also Covers Sep-
arate Liability for Breach of Contract. In an action by insurance agents
against their insurer, a court of civil appeals dealt with the construction
of an insurance policy covering the agents' liability to their principals aris-
ing from the agents' "negligence, errors, or omissions."' In a former case,
the insurance agents had been held liable to one principal on two distinct
grounds-breach of contract and fraud. 7 The "negligence, errors, or omis-
sions" insurance policy contained an exclusionary clause stating that the
policy did not apply to any dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal acts of the
insurance agents. The court reasoned that since the agents had been held
liable to one principal on the two distinct and separate grounds of breach
of contract and fraud, each ground constituted an independent cause of
the entire loss to the principal. Therefore, the clause excluding coverage
for the agents' fraud was not applicable, and the agents' liability for
breach of contract was within the policy coverage."
64National Surety Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 431 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1968).
65 This decision extends to Bankers Blanket Bonds the Texas rule with respect to general liability
policies that if a third party's pleadings allege facts which bring the loss within the provisions of
the policy then regardless of the truth or falsity of the pleadings, the insurer owes a duty to de-
fend or is liable for the fees incurred by the insured in providing his own defense. See Heyden New-
port Chem. Corp. v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1965); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Moritz, 138 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), error ref.
66 Cagle v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
6 National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allco Ins. Agency, 403 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
68 As authority for its position, the court quoted from the following annotation: 63 A.L.R.2d
1122, 1123 (1959). No Texas cases were cited.
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Medical Payment Coverage Extends to Passenger Struck by an Automo-
bile. The impact of our affluent society as seen by multiple automobile
ownership continues to raise problems under the "expenses for medical
services" provisions of insurance policies. " A court of civil appeals held
that a family automobile liability policy on three different automobiles,
providing for medical payments coverage on one automobile but not on
the other two, covered medical expenses for the insured's daughter who
was killed while riding as a passenger in one of the automobiles for which
no medical payment coverage was written." The court's theory was that
the policy coverage for medical payments extended expressly to relatives
who sustained bodily injury "through being struck by an automobile." In
addition, the court found no exclusions or limitations to this express cov-
erage.
Automobile Parked on Shoulder of Street by Driver Is Not Being "Op-
erated" Within the Meaning of the Policy Exclusion. Another case in-
volved the construction of an exclusionary clause in an automobile policy
providing that coverage "shall not apply with respect to any claim arising
from accidents which occur while any automobile is being operated by Al-
fred Calvin Rogers."" At the time of the accident the insured automobile
had been parked on the shoulder of a street for at least three minutes be-
fore it was struck in the rear by another automobile. Rogers had been
driving the car immediately before parking it, and he was still in the
driver's seat when the automobile was struck. The court, applying the
general rules that policies will be strictly construed against the insurer and
liberally construed in favor of the insured, held that the parked automo-
bile was not being "operated" by Rogers at the time it was struck. A 1924
civil appeals decision" holding that a truck temporarily stopped on the
highway was being "operated" within the meaning of a statute requiring
automobiles to carry lights when in operation during certain times of the
day was distinguished by the court on the basis that insurance policy con-
struction was not involved and that the question of whether the truck was
being "operated" at the time of the collision was immaterial since the basic
issue in that case was whether the failure to have lights was an act of
negligence resulting in injury to the plaintiffs.
"' See Davis, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 88, 107 (1967).
'
0 Cockrum v. Travelers Indem. Co., 420 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" Commercial Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 418 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error dismissed.
72Horton v. Benson, 266 S.W. 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), aff'd, 277 S.W. 1050 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1925).
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